A Separating Equilibrium For Stock Repurchase Programs via Put Options: Transforming a Mathematical Proof into Visual Form
Stock repurchase programs serve as signals to investors that the repurchasing company is undervalued and has the financial means to accomplish the program. For example, Comment and Jarrell (1991) show that fixed-price tender offer repurchases have greater signaling power than
Dutch auction or open market repurchases. Wansley, Lane and Sarkar (1989) provide evidence from a management survey indicating that repurchases are indicative of management's confidence in the future and also show that survey responses of tender offer repurchasers differ from those of open-market repurchasers. Ikenberry and Vermaelen (1996) explain that open-market repurchase programs give managers the option to repurchase if the stock is undervalued but to forego repurchasing if it is not. The signaling power of repurchases depends not only on the form of the repurchase but also the regulatory environment. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) show that UK firms are less able to capitalize on their undervalued stocks through repurchases due to regulatory provisions.
An alternative to direct repurchase of stock is a synthetic repurchase program (SRP) wherein a company issues put options on their own stock under an ongoing repurchase program. As described by Gyoshev (2001) synthetic repurchase programs provides a credible signal to investors that the issuing firm is undervalued even though no funds are distributed by the signaling company. This signal is present because a separating equilibrium exists between financially strong firms that can implement an SRP and financially weak firms that cannot mimic this activity. Much like a fixedprice tender offer, issuance of a put option on the company's stock also commits the company to the program, unlike an open-market repurchase program that can be foregone if conditions change.
Signaling via an SRP program is unique in that it does not require a costly outflow of funds.
Signaling models typically rely upon costly expenditures that lower-quality firms cannot afford. Diamond (1984) shows that a costly bankruptcy process produces a separating equilibrium. A separating equilibrium for different forms of stock offerings is developed by Heinkel and Schwartz (1986) , but the costs are not explicit cash outlays but can be a penalty cost in the case of an uninsured rights offering. In their model, the highest-quality firm will engage in an uninsured rights offering, which has the lowest immediate cash outlay cost, but the possibility of a failed offering for lower-quality firms. The lower-quality firms will instead rely on underwritten stock offerings, which have higher explicit costs of underwriting, but lesser penalty cost of failure.
The SRP programs are typically accomplished through company-issued over-the-counter put options on a firm's own stock rather than exchange-listed options. The use of company-issued OTC options exposes the buyer to default risk of the issuing firm, which complicates matters further, but produces the separating equilibria. In this paper we develop a separating equilibrium between financially strong firms that can undertake SRP programs using company-issued put derivatives and financially weak firms that cannot mimic the behavior. This separating equilibrium depends upon the default risk of the issuing company that precludes financially weak firms from issuing put derivatives. The separating equilibrium also allows issuing firms to signal better quality future projects.
We next present a method for visualizing default risk of company-issued put derivatives and a method for visualizing the separating equilibrium. The visual presentation of put option outcomes incorporates default risk of the issuing firm in those outcomes. After developing this visual presentation we compare this graph to those currently used in the financial literature. We then compare and test learning outcomes and student satisfaction across two different presentation orders for the mathematical and visual presentation. Our results show significantly improved learning outcomes and student satisfaction when the visual presentation precedes the mathematical proof rather than the opposite order.
These results demonstrate the benefits to students of developing visual presentations and having students understand the intuition of a mathematical proof prior to presenting the proof rather than after its presentation. Similarly, Datar and Matthews (2004) develop and intuitive algorithm for valuing real options that uses a simple three-step process shown in a single diagram to estimate the value of a real option implied in a capital budgeting project. This intuitive approach provides an estimate that is algebraically identical to the estimate provided by the Black and Scholes model but does not require the statistical framework used by that well-known model.
The widespread use and continuing development of new forms of put options and new applications of put options requires financial professionals and students who aspire to become financial professionals to understand these forms of derivatives. Understanding these innovations and their implications for understanding valuation is a core competency of a financial analyst, according to Smithson (2009) . Smithson provides an outline of the principles for valuing structured credit products and other illiquid securities. For example, credit default swaps are a form of put options that pay off when borrower repayments are less than a specified amount. Brandon and Fernandez (2005) describe credit default swaps along with several related financial innovations in credit derivatives, including CAT bonds, catastrophe risk swaps and catastrophe risk financing. Their description includes a discussion of the factors affecting valuation of these instruments Understanding put options is key to understanding more exotic derivatives that are based on, or forms of, put options. Numerous authors, including Choi and Ward (1989) , Gastineau (1997) , Cromwell and Hodges (1998) and Chacko, Tufano and Verter (2000) present the importance of properly teaching put options so that students can understand them. Student understanding of put options is critical to their understanding of applications, such as sales of put derivatives by underlying companies.
Selling put options on its own stock allows a corporation to signal its quality to investors and generate a separating equilibrium between itself and lower-quality firms. Put derivatives sales by underlying companies have been gaining popularity during the last bull market. Gyoshev (2001) , in a review of 18,432 annual and quarterly reports, identified 383 companies in US that use put options in some form and 54 companies that issue put options on their own stock. Some of these issuances can be quite large. Microsoft Corporation alone has sold more than $2,000,000,000 worth of put option on their own stock, as noted by Atanasov, Gyoshev, Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (2001) and Gyoshev, Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (2002) .
This paper begins with development and description of a mathematical proof for the separating equilibrium provided by synthetic repurchase programs using put options. We next transform the mathematical proof of this separating equilibrium into a graphical depiction that can be grasped more easily. The third part of the paper explains the experimental design of a study designed to test the efficacy of that graphical depiction in enhancing learning outcomes and student satisfaction and presents the empirical results of the statistical analysis performed to test learning outcomes and student satisfaction across both teaching alternatives. The fourth part of the paper contains the conclusion.
I. Mathematical Proof of the Model: Payoffs to financially strong and financially weak firms from engaging in an SRP
This section presents a mathematical proof of the separating equilibrium between financially strong firms and financially weak firms that results from use of an SRP. Both financially strong and financially weak firms will get 0 if they don't initiate an SRP (i.e. don't sell put options). Therefore, the firms sell put options only if the premium they will get is larger than the value of the put option computed given their private information. We denote this condition as condition (A).
We denote the function of cash settlement for put options sold on organized exchange (no incorporated credit risk) at put expirations with h(price):
where X is the strike price of the put and S p is the stock price at put expiration. We denote the function of cash settlement for existing underlying firm sold put option (with incorporated credit risk) at put expirations with g(price).
where X is the strike price of the put, S p is the stock price at put expiration and Y is the break-even price at which all firm assets will be submitted to the put holder as settlement for the put. For S p < Y the firm will declare bankruptcy. This will be done when the total assets of the firm are equal to B = X -Y. The put premium for financially strong firms is equal to:
where f FS (price) is the probability density functions (pdf) of the prices of financially strong firm.
The put premium for financially weak and for any firm from an uninformed investor perspective firm is developed in a similar fashion.
where f FW (price) is the probability density functions (pdf) of the prices of financially weak firm and f A (price) is the probability density functions (pdf) of the prices from uninformed investor prospective.
Without loss of generality, we could assume that put options are going to be traded only for firms which have Y < E(S p ) i.e. for which Y, the breakeven point, is smaller than the expected stock price at put expiration, i.e. firms that are not expected to be bankrupt at put expiration. We denote this condition as condition (B). Also, without loss of generality, for simplification of computations presented here, we can assume that the three stochastic dominance distributions have increasing means and the same standard deviations that are smaller than the minima of the means. We denote this condition as condition (C).
We denoted by P FS the payoff from SRP (the sale of put options) for financially strong firms and we denote P FW the payoff from SRP (the sale of put options) for financially weak firms. Therefore, taking into account condition (A) the payoffs for the financially strong firms and correspondingly for financially weak firms will be.
i.e. the firm's management will initiate a SRP (i.e. sell put options) only if they are expecting positive expected net present value (NPV) of the put sale cash flows. If there is a negative expected NPV of the put sale cash flows then company will chose not to participate.
A. Solution:
(I) The individual rationality constraint for a financially strong firm coincides with the incentive compatibility constraint for a financially strong firm, and both reduce to the following inequality:
This condition directly follows from equations (3) and (5) and the stochastic dominance condition.
(II) The individual rationality constraint for a financially weak firm is similar.
This condition directly follows from equations (4) and (5) and the stochastic dominance condition.
When we combine both conditions (I) and (II) from equations (10) and (11) we receive that:
This assures that only firms of type FS will sell put options. Financially strong firms have positive private information about their future performance. The true value of the put options computed using their private information is lower than the market value without private information.
Therefore, financially strong firms will sell overvalued puts and earn positive profits. On the other hand, financially weak firms have private information that their performance will be less than average. The value of the put option computed using their private information will be higher than the premium computed using only publicly known information. Consequently, a unique separating equilibrium exists.
II. Visual Depiction of the Separating Equilibrium

A. Default Risk in Synthetic Repurchase Programs
Investors buying a bond from an issuing corporation are exposed to default risk if the company cannot generate sufficient cash flows to pay interest and principal. Similarly, investors buying put options from an issuing corporation also face default risk if the issuing corporation is unable to produce the cash flows required to pay off the put buyers at expiration. Put options become valuable when the expected future cash flows of the underlying corporation become impaired to the point that the stock price falls below the exercise price of the put option. The same impairment of cash flows that creates value in the put option also creates risk that the company will not be able to honor its obligations to put holders. Therefore, in extreme cases, the put owners who should have been expecting a large payoff due to corporate misfortunes are disappointed when those misfortunes become so large that company bankruptcy leads to default on put options it previously issued.
In Figure 1 we compare the payoff outcomes from bond issuance payoff outcomes with (a) put option issuance by the underlying company and (b) put options traded on an organized exchange.
Bond payoff outcomes show the company value, shareholder value and bondholder value as the stock price changes. Option payoff outcomes compare the value of both put options in relation to the stock price changes. The similarity of the profile of outcomes between bond issuance and put option issuance by the underlying company is due to the presence of default risk in both cases. In the comparison of exchange-traded versus company-issued put options default risk for the latter leads to truncation of payoffs when cash flows and stock value go to their lower bounds.
The concept that a put option might behave like a bond might not be easy to grasp, since options are linked to a form of levered equity rather than any type of fixed income instrument. The graphical depiction of the similarity presented in Figure 1 should help to overcome some of the difficulty in relating options to fixed income instruments.
B. Graphical Depiction of the Separating Equilibrium
Without loss of generality, we assume that firms issuing puts will be offered the fair-market put premium based on publicly available information. However, prior to initiating a synthetic repurchase program, only managers know whether their firm is financially strong or financially weak. Uninformed investors will assume that all firms have the same probability distribution of stock prices at put expiration. Without loss of generality, we assume that put options are sold only on firms for which non-performance is not expected at put expiration.
We can also assume, without loss of generality, that at the moment the put option is written there are three stochastically dominant distributions that will represent the probability function of the stock price at put option expiration represented in Figure 2 . These three distributions are the distribution of financially strong firms, the distribution of financially weak firms, and the expected distribution of the stock price at put expiration from the uninformed investors' perspective.
The difference between an exchange-traded put option and a put option written by a firm is the default risk of the underlying firm. As shown in Figure 3 , in the case of an exchange-traded put option, when the stock price of the firm falls, the put option goes deeper into the money (the X line), and the exchange guarantees payment through its clearing house, i.e., provides "insurance" in case of default of the firm. But when a put option is written by a firm, there is a risk of default (P line). If the stock price of the firm drops, there is a point at which the total value of the firm will be paid to the put holder as a settlement payment. Below this point (under $30 dollars per share in Figure 3 ), the firm will default, and the put holders (P-line) will not be properly compensated, unlike the holders of exchange-traded puts (represented by Line X).
Let us consider the situation from the perspective of the stockholders (S line). There is a point under which the claim of the stockholders has zero value, and the firm will go bankrupt (under $30
per share in Figure 3 ). When the stock price is between this point and the put option exercise price, some of the value of the firm will accrue to stockholders and some to the put-holders (between $30 and $60 dollars per share in Figure 3) . Finally, when the stock price is above the put option strike price (above $60 dollars in Figure 3) , shareholders keep the entire value of the firm. And, for comparison, if there is no sale of put options (SRP), shareholders keep everything for themselves independently of the stock price distribution (T line).
To assess the signaling effect of put option issuance during SRP by a financially weak or financially strong firm, we need to find three different put premia: one for financially strong; one for financially weak firms and another for firms from the perspective of uniformed investors. In Figure 4 we get the value of the three put options as the area between the three pairs of respective curves. The area between the W and WP curves represents the value of the put for financially weak firm. The area between the S and SP curves represents the value of the put for financially strong firm. The area between the A and AP curves represents the value of the put for any firm form the We also devise a simpler way of computing the put premia for the three firms (financially weak, average and financially strong), which is to integrate what the put holder is going to get at put expiration 1 over the three statistic dominance distributions. Even though Figure 5 is easier to understand than Figure 4 , the financial insight is derived from Figure 4 , which necessitates that it is presented first. Figure 5 clearly displays the big difference between the three situations, which confirms the resulting separating equilibrium through put options.
In Figure 5 we get the value of the 3 put options as the area below the three respective curves. The area below the W curve the represents the value of the put for financially weak firm. The area below the S curve represents the value of the put for financially strong firm. The area below the A curve represents the value of the put for any firm form the uninformed investor prospective. We obtain this lines W, S, and A, by visually integrating line P (Put Holder Profile) from Figure The large difference between the three put premiums across the financially strong, the average and the financially weak firms creates a separating equilibrium between the financially strong and financially weak firms. Financially strong firms are rewarded for selling put options and certifying their quality, while financially weak firms will choose not to participate, because of the large expected financial penalties imposed on them. This is a unique way of signaling. On one side, the signaling firm is communicating its strong financial future and at the same time is receiving cashflows for certifying its quality. On the other side it is extremely expensive for financially weak firms to mimic the financially strong ones. This creates the separating equilibrium, which is unique because the firm receives cash flow instead of disbursing cash flow.
III. An Experiment to Test Understanding of the Visual vs. Mathematical Presentation
The purpose of developing a visual depiction of the separating equilibrium is to aid in understanding that equilibrium more easily. We develop an experiment to test whether the visual depiction helps in understanding the concept of the separating equilibrium for SRPs. The Both sections were presented same course module titled "achieving a separating equilibrium through put options", but with the sequence of the material rearranged. All remaining items on the course syllabus were presented in exactly the same way across the two courses. Also, both sections
were first presented with a definition and the same examples of achieving separating equilibrium 1 Take into account that the put option is written by a firm. Therefore there is default risk.
through put options. The first section, which is the control group, consists of 39 senior undergraduate students, who were presented material in the traditional order, with the mathematical proof first and the visual proof second. The second section, which is the test group, consists of 33 senior undergraduate students, who were presented with the visual proof first, followed by the mathematical proof. After the basic presentation, on "achieving a separating equilibrium through put options" exactly the same applications and cases were presented to both groups in the same order. With identical introductory and concluding material, the only difference between the control group and the experimental group was the order of presentation of the mathematical and visual proofs of the separating equilibrium.
Understanding of the separating equilibrium material was tested by three short quizzes or tests, The following two hypotheses are the focus of the study:
H1: When the mathematical proof is presented first and then followed with the visual proof, learning outcomes are improved relative to presentation first with the visual proof and then with the mathematical proof.
H2:
When the mathematical proof is presented first followed by the visual proof, learning satisfaction is improved relative to when the presentation order is reversed.
The next section of the paper contains the results of the test of these hypotheses.
A. Experimental Results and Discussion of Results
Results of testing for differences in learning outcomes across the control and experimental groups are presented in Table I . Our results show that if a mathematical proof is presented first, student learning is statistically significantly worse than the learning occurring when the material is taught after first introducing the graphical proof. Students in the experimental group receiving the visual material first have, on average, 11.12% better grades than the students taught using the alternative method. The difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. Surprisingly, there is no statistical difference in the learning outcomes for the visual approach independent of its sequence. The difference between average grades is 1.19% which is statistically insignificant. We can conclude that the students learn using the visual proof the same way regardless of the presentation order. The results from the final quiz show that overall understanding significantly improves when the visual proof is introduced first. The students have on average 6.95% better grades in the experimental group as compared to the control group, which is statistically significant at 10% level.
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The second test, presented in Table II , examines individual learning satisfaction with the class.
Conclusions regarding satisfaction with the discussed learning of the "achieving separating equilibrium through put options" could be reached because the remaining material is presented and tested in exactly the same way. The order of the mathematical and visual proof of the "achieving separating equilibrium through put options" is reversed for both groups. As expected, we see the biggest difference in Item 7, "Lectures were clearly presented," of 19.6 percent between the two groups, which is statistically significant at the 5% level. The two groups were presented with exactly the same lectures. The only difference was the order of the mathematical proof. Students were more satisfied with the visual -mathematical proof pattern. These conclusions pertain to the following Items as well. The second biggest difference between the two groups of 19.4% also at 5% statistical significance level is in Item 2 "Used class time well". The third biggest difference of 15.9% also at 5% statistical significance level is in Item 3 "Well prepared for class". We observe that the students feel that the lecturer is less prepared, if the material is presented in the traditional fashion. There was no statistical difference between the final grades between the two classes, indicating no difference in abilities between the two groups.
The students also felt that there is less "agreement between the syllabus and material taught" (Item 1 -10.0%), which is marginally statistically significant, although not a valid comment since the same material was presented in both sections. The only difference in the two syllabuses was the timing of the mathematical and visual proofs, and in both syllabuses the promised order was followed. A possible explanation of this finding is that a general bias of more/less satisfied students transfers to all answers in the questionnaire. Similarly, students in the control group reported that the lecturer has not "raised challenging questions" (Item 6 -9.7%). We attribute this result to the fact that the students from the experimental group have superior understanding of the material and find the questions not only challenging, but also interesting and related to the class material. Not surprisingly, the students from the experimental group find that the "Overall teacher was effective"
(Item 10 -8.7%) more than the control group.
We find that there is small difference, not statistically significant, between the two groups in the following categories: Item 4: "Readily available for consultation", Item 5: "I felt free to ask questions"; Item 8: "Exams fairly reflected material" and Item 9: "Graded fairly". This lack of difference shows that the students express their overall satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the class in all categories consistently, but they do not penalize the instructor in the non class-material related categories as severely as in the understanding-of-the-material related categories.
The observed separation of the evaluation items to those that are class-material related and those that are instructor-related is very important. All the items in the category related to class material differ significantly across the two groups. All the items from the instructor-related group are not statistically significant. This suggests that students correctly assess that the difference between the two groups lies with the material and not with the instructor and thus lends further credibility to their perception of the difference in material.
This study provides evidence to support our hypothesis that a visual proof is easier to learn than the mathematical proof. Also, our results suggest that introducing the visual proof before the mathematical proof strongly enhances the understanding of the mathematical proof and the concept as a whole, without harming the understanding of the visual proof. Thus, our study results suggest that a graphical proof should be introduced first. This corroborates the findings of Datar and Mathews (2004) , Grossman, Powell, Womack and Zhang (2002) , and Smithson (2009) who demonstrate the importance of using intuitive and visual approaches in teaching derivatives. Also, the results of the student quizzes clearly indicate that presenting the visual proof first enhances the clarity of the mathematical proof. Furthermore, our experimental results confirmed that the understanding of the visual proof is not enhanced by its juxtaposition with respect to the mathematical proof. Overall we conclude that, when the visual proof is introduced first, learning outcomes and student satisfaction are enhanced.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we show that synthetic repurchase programs using put options can produce a separating equilibrium between firms that have good future prospects and those that do not have good future prospects. The default risk of the put option issuer leads to the separating equilibrium because companies with poor future prospects, where the put option might become very valuable, could default on the put option after the poor future prospects are realized. At the same time, companies with poor future prospects receive similar premia from issuing puts than companies with good prospects. Therefore, only companies with good future prospects will issue put options on their own stock, which certifies their future prospects. This signaling equilibrium is unique because it allows producing a signal of quality without generation of a costly signal. Not only does the signal not require dispersal of cash, but it allows a cash inflow to be enjoyed by the signaling firm.
We develop the signaling equilibrium first mathematically and then develop it graphically, in a form that can be interpreted visually. Results of an experiment show that learning outcomes are enhanced by showing the graphical version of the signaling equilibrium prior to the mathematical version. Learning satisfaction is also enhanced by showing the graphical version first, followed by the mathematical version.
Default Risk
FIGURE 1. Comparison of Payoff Profile and Default Risk Profile for a Bond, a Company Issued Put on Its Own Stock vs. Exchange Issued Put
a To highlight the similarity in Default Risk profile the payoff outcomes from bond issuance (on the left) is compared to the payoff outcomes with (a) put option issuance by the underlying company and (b) put options traded on an organized exchange (on the right). T -Firm Value is the value accorded to a stockholder if the company does not issue bond (on the left) or sell put options (on the right). SStockholder Profile is the outcome profile for a stockholder of a firm that has issued bond (on the left) or has sold put options on its own stock (on the right). B -Bondholder Profile is the outcome profile for a bondholder of a firm. P -Put Holder Profile is the outcome profile for a firm-issued-put having default risk. X -Exchange Traded Put Profile is the outcome profile for a default-free exchange-traded put; 
Firms at Put Expiration
a At the moment the put option is written there are three stochastically dominant distributions that will represent the probability function of the stock price at put option expiration represented S -Financially Strong Firm: is a firm for which the management knows that future prospects are better than expected; W -Financially Weak Firm: is a firm for which the management knows that future prospects are worse than expected; A -Stock Price Distribution From Uninformed Investor Prospective: Investors who are unable to distinguish between strong and weak firms will ascribe the same outcomes to both; TABLE I . Tests for learning outcomes after each arrangement using the same set of quizzes rearranging only the timing of the quizzes to coincide with the taught material a Panel A reports the tests for learning outcomes for Section 1, (the control group with 39 senior undergraduate students), for which mathematical proof is presented first and then followed with the visual proof. Panel B reports the tests for learning outcomes for Section 2, (the test group with 33 senior undergraduate students), for which visual proof is presented first and then followed with the mathematical proof. The same set of quizzes is used for both groups rearranged only by the timing of the quizzes to coincide with the taught material. Panel C reports the t-test for the differences between the two sections. b The difference between the average results for the final exam for the two sections is statically indistinguishable. So there is no difference in abilities between the two groups. 
